A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. For this model, a dynamic programming characterization of the value is presented under some assumptions on its existence. This dynamic program is then used for a class of zero-sum stochastic games with complete information on one side and partial information on the other, that is, games where one player has complete information about state, actions and observation history while the other player may only have partial information about the state and action history. For such games, the value is characterized using dynamic programming without making any existence assumptions. It is further shown that for this class of games, there exists a Nash equilibrium where the more informed player plays a common information belief based strategy. A dynamic programming approach is presented for computing this strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates games where two players can influence the evolution of a stochastic dynamic system but may have different information about the system. The two players have completely opposite goals: one player wants to minimize a cost while the other wants to maximize it. Such zero-sum games can be used as a modeling framework for the design and analysis of defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks in cyber-physical sytems, networks and autonomous sytems.
We would like to find the value and a Nash equilibrium [1] of our zero-sum stochastic game of asymmetric information. Our model captures a wide variety of information structures where one or both players may have partial observations about the system. Due to partial observability and asymmetry in players' information, it is not clear whether a Nash equilibrium exists. Even if it does exist, finding the value and a Nash equilibrium may be computationally intractable in general. For this general model, we provide a dynamic programming approach for characterizing the value (if it exists) under some assumptions on the existence of values in certain one-stage games. This dynamic programming characterization of the value relies on our construction of two virtual games that have the same value as our original game.
We then focus on games in which one player (say the defender) has complete information, that is the defender knows the system state and attacker's information, while the other player (attacker) may have partial information on the system state and defender's actions. In our model, we allow both players to control the system state. Our model can be Dhruva viewed as a generalization of those in [2] , [3] , [4] and [5] . For such games with complete information on one side, we use our dynamic programming approach to characterize the value without any assumptions on existence. Further, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the more informed player plays a common information belief based strategy [6] , [7] and our dynamic programming approach can be used to compute this strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related works in Section I-A and in Section I-B, we describe the notation used in this paper. We formulate the game in Section II and describe a virtual game with symmetric information in Section III. In Section IV, we describe an expanded virtual game, establish the equivalence of the values of the original and the expanded game and describe our dynamic programming characterization of the value. In Section V, we analyze the model with complete information on one side. We conclude the paper in Section VI. Due to space constraints, detailed proofs of all the results in this paper are provided in [8] .
A. Related Work
Solving stochastic zero-sum games with complete information on one side and limited information on the other has been investigated before with varying degrees of generality. In [9] , [2] , [10] , the state evolution was uncontrolled, in [3] , [4] , the state could only be controlled by the moreinformed player and in [5] , the state could be controlled by both players. In all these works, both players' actions are commonly observed and in all except [10] , the less-informed player has no state information. In our model, we allow the system to be controlled by both players. While the defender in our model has complete information (state and attacker's information), the attacker may only have partial information on the state and action history.
General (i.e. not necessarily zero-sum) stochastic games of asymmetric information were considered in [6] , [7] and [11] . In [6] , a dynamic program for finding Nash equilibria was presented but under an assumption on the players' information (see Assumption 2 in [6] ). This assumption holds only for certain classes of information structures and may not necessarily be true for our model. Authors in [7] and [11] provide characterizations of perfect Bayesian equilibria for some games of asymmetric information. Players' actions are commonly observed in the models of [7] , [11] ; this may not be the case for our zero-sum game model. Further, the solutions in [7] , [11] rely on strong existence assumptions that may not be true in general.
Our work is most closely related to [12] and [6] . We follow the approach in [12] and build on its results. The system model in [12] conformed to a specific structure, that is, the system state could be decomposed into three components: a public state that is commonly observed (perhaps partially) and a privately observed component for each player. The model in our paper is substantially more general than in [12] . Another major restriction in [12] was that the players were allowed to play only pure strategies. In this paper, we allow the players to play behavioral strategies. Our model is similar to [6] but we do not make the critical assumption made in [6] that the common information based beliefs be strategy-independent (see Assumption 2 of [6] ). Removing this assumption makes our model much more widely applicable than the model in [6] .
B. Notation
Random variables/vectors are denoted by upper case letters, their realizations by the corresponding lower case letters. In general, subscripts are used as time index while superscripts are used to index decision making agents. For time indices t 1 ≤ t 2 , X t1:t2 (resp. g t1:t2 ) is the short hand notation for the variables (X t1 , X t1+1 , ..., X t2 ) (resp. functions (g t1 , . . . , g t2 )). Similarly, X 1:2 is the short hand notation for the collection of variables (X 1 , X 2 ). Operators P(·) and E[·] denote the probability of an event, and the expectation of a random variable respectively. For random variables/vectors X and Y , P(·|Y = y), E[X|Y = y] and P(X = x | Y = y) are denoted by P(·|y), E[X|y] and P(x | y), respectively. For a strategy g, we use P g (·) (resp. E g [·]) to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g. For any finite set A, ∆A denotes the probability simplex over the set A.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a dynamic system with two players. The system operates in discrete time over a horizon T . Let X t ∈ X t be the state of the system at time t, and let U i t ∈ U i t be the action of player i at time t, where i = 1, 2. The state of the system evolves in a controlled Markovian manner as
where W s t is the system noise. There are two observation processes
where W 1 t and W 2 t are observation noises. We assume that the sets X t , U i t and Y i t are finite for all i and t. Further, the random variables X 1 , W s t , W i t (referred to as the primitive random variables) can take finitely many values and are mutually independent.
The collection of variables (i.e. observations, actions) available to player i at time t is denoted by I i t . I i t is a subset of all observations until time t and actions until t − 1, i.e, I i t ⊆ {Y 1:2 1:t , U 1:2 1:t−1 }. The set of all possible realizations of I i t is denoted by I i t .
Information I i t can be decomposed into private and common information, i.e. I i t = C t ∪ P i t . Common information C t is the set of variables known to both players at time t while variables in the private information P i t are known only to player i. Let C t be the set of all realizations of common information at time t and let P i t be the set of all realizations of private information for player i at time t. We make the following assumption on the evolution of common and private information. This is similar to Assumption 1 of [6] . Note that we do not impose Assumption 2 of [6] . Assumption 1. The evolution of common and private information available to the players is as follows:
1) The common information C t is increasing with time,
where ζ t+1 is a fixed transformation.
2) The private information evolves as
where ξ i t+1 is a fixed transformation. As noted in [13] and [6] , a number of information structures satisfy the above assumption.
Players can use any information available to them to select their actions and we allow behavioral strategies for both players. Thus, player i chooses a distribution δU i t over its action space using a control law g i t :
Player i's action at time t is randomly chosen from U i t according to the distribution δU i t . We will at times refer to δU i t as player i's behavioral action at time t. It will be helpful for our analysis to explicitly describe the randomization procedure used by the players. To do so, we assume that player i has access to i.i.d. random variables V i 1:T that are uniformly distributed over the interval (0, 1]. The variables V 1 1:T , V 2 1:T are independent of each other and of the primitive random variables. Further, player i has access to a mechanism κ that takes as input V i t and a distribution over U i t and generates a random action with the input distribution. Thus, player i's action at time t can be written as
. Remark 1. One choice of the mechanism κ can be described as follows: Suppose U i t = {1, 2, ..n} and the input distribution is (p 1 , ...p n ). We can partition the interval (0, 1] into n intervals (a i , b i ] such that the length of ith interval
The collection of control laws g i = (g i 1 , . . . , g i T ) is referred to as the control strategy of player i, and the pair of control strategies (g 1 , g 2 ) is referred to as a strategy profile. Let the set of all possible control strategies for player i be G i .
The total expected cost associated with a strategy profile (g 1 , g 2 ) is
where c t : X t × U 1 t × U 2 t → R is the cost function at time t. Player 1 wants to minimize the total expected cost, while Player 2 wants to maximize it. A Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game is a strategy profile (g 1 * , g 2 * ) such that for every g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have J(g 1 * , g 2 ) ≤ J(g 1 * , g 2 * ) ≤ J(g 1 , g 2 * ).
We refer to this game as Game G . We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. A Nash equilibrium (g 1 * , g 2 * ) exists in Game G .
Remark 2. Note that if players have perfect recall, i.e.
for every i and t, then the existence of a behavior strategy equilibrium is guaranteed by Kuhn's theorem [14] and Assumption 2 is not needed.
Since Game G is a zero-sum game, all the Nash equilibria achieve the same total expected cost [1] . This equilibrium cost is referred to as the value of the game and will be denoted by S(G ). The objective of this work is to characterize the value S(G ). To this end, we will define a virtual game G v and an expanded virtual game G e , and show that all these games have the same value as Game G . We will then describe a method for computing the value of game G e and thus that of G .
III. VIRTUAL GAME G v
The virtual game G v is constructed using the methodology in [6] . This game involves the same set of primitive random variables as in Game G . The two players of game G are replaced by two virtual players in G v . The virtual players operate as follows. At each time t, virtual player i selects a function Γ i t that maps private information P i t to a distribution δU i t over the space U i t . We refer to these functions as prescriptions. Let B i t be the set of all possible prescriptions for virtual player i at time t (i.e. B i t is the set of all mappings from P i t to ∆U i t ). Once the virtual players select their prescriptions, the actions U i t are randomly generated according to distributions Γ i t (P i t ). More precisely, the system dynamics for this game are given by:
where the functions f t , h i t , ξ i t and ζ t are the same as in G .
In the virtual game, virtual players use the common information C t to select their prescriptions at time t. The ith virtual player selects its prescription according to a control law χ i t , i.e. Γ i t = χ i t (C t ). Let the set of all such control laws χ i t for player i at time t be H i t . For virtual player i, the collection of control laws over the entire time horizon χ i = (χ i 1 , . . . , χ i T ) is referred to as his control strategy. Let H i be the set of all control strategies for player i, i.e.
The total cost associated with the game for a strategy profile (χ 1 , χ 2 ) is
where the function c t is the same as in Game G .
The following lemma establishes a connection between the original game G and the virtual game G v constructed above. Proof. The result is a corollary of results in [6] .
The authors in [6] use the virtual game to find equilibrium costs and strategies for a stochastic dynamic game of asymmetric information. However, the methodology in [6] is applicable only under the assumption that the posterior beliefs on state X t and private information P 1,2 t given the common information do not depend on the strategy profile being used (see Assumption 2 in [6] ). We will refer to this assumption as the strategy-independent beliefs (SIB) assumption. As pointed out in [6] , the SIB assumption is satisfied by some special information structures but is not true for general models of common and private informations.
Thus, we are faced with the following situation: if the information structure of our zero-sum game satisfies the SIB assumption, we can adopt the results in [6] to find equilibrium costs (i.e. the value) of our game. However, if the zero-sum game does not satisfy the SIB assumption, then the methodology of [6] is inapplicable. In the next section, we will develop a methodology to find the value of the zero-sum game even when the information structure does not satisfy the SIB assumption.
IV. EXPANDED VIRTUAL GAME G e WITH PRESCRIPTION HISTORY
We now construct an expanded virtual game G e by increasing the amount of information available to virtual players in game G v . In this new game G e , the state dynamics, observation processes, primitive variables and cost function are all the same as in the game G v . The only difference is in the information used by the virtual players to select their prescriptions. The virtual players now have access to the common information C t as well as all the past prescriptions of both players, i.e., Γ 1:2 1:t−1 . Thus, virtual player i selects its prescription at time t using a control lawχ i t , i.e, Γ i t = χ i t (C t , Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ). Let the set of all such control laws at time t for virtual player i beH i t .H i =H i 1 × · · · ×H i T is the set of all control strategies for player i. The total cost associated with the game for a strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) is
where U i t is drawn from the distribution Γ i t (P i t ) and Γ i t = χ i t (C t , Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ), for i = 1, 2. A. Equivalence of Values of Games G v and G e
We will now show that any equilibrium strategy profile of game G v is also an equilibrium strategy profile of the game G e . To do so, we define the following mappings between the strategies in games G v and G e . Definition 1. Let i :H 1 ×H 2 → H i be an operator that maps a strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) in virtual game G e to a strategyχ i for virtual player i in game G v as follows: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
whereγ j s =χ j s (c s ,γ 1:2 1:s−1 ) for every 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 and j = 1, 2. We denote the ordered pair ( 1 , 2 ) by .
The mapping is defined in such a way that the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) and the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) induce identical dynamics in the respective games G e and G v . Definition 2. Let ς i : H i →H i be an operator that maps χ i toχ i such that for each time t,χ i t (c t , γ 1:2 1:t−1 ) = χ i t (c t ) for every c t ∈ C t . Also, let ς := (ς 1 , ς 2 ). Lemma 2. Let (χ 1 , χ 2 ) and (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) be strategy profiles for games G v and G e , such that χ i = i (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), i = 1, 2. Then,
Proof. See [8] for the proof.
We now show that if (χ 1 * , χ 2 * ) is a Nash equilibrium in the virtual game G v , then ς(χ 1 * , χ 2 * ) is a Nash equilibrium in the expanded game G e . Theorem 1. The values of the games G v and G e are equal, i.e. S(G e ) = S(G v ). Further, if (χ 1 * , χ 2 * ) is an equilibrium strategy profile in the virtual game G v , then (χ 1 * ,χ 2 * ) := ς(χ 1 * , χ 2 * ) is an equilibrium in the expanded game G e .
Based on Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, we can conclude that the values of the original game G , the virtual game G v and the expanded virtual game G e are the same, i.e., S(G e ) = S(G v ) = S(G ).
B. The Dynamic Programming Algorithm
We now describe a methodology for finding S(G e ). Suppose the virtual players are using the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) in the expanded game G e . Let Π t be the virtual players' belief on the state and private information based on their information in game G e . Thus, Π t is defined as Π t (x t , p 1:2 t ) := P (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) (X t = x t , P 1:2 t = p 1:2 t | C t , Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ).
We refer to Π t as the common information belief (CIB).
Definition 3. Given a belief π on the state and private informations at time t and mappings γ i , i = 1, 2, from P i Theorem 2 gives us a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game. One approach to solving these dynamic programs approximately is to discretize the CIB belief space and compute the values (and equilibrium strategies) of the single-stage games SG t (π t ) in a backward inductive manner. Unlike in [6] , however, the single-stage games SG t (π t ) herein may not be simple Bayesian games. The strategy spaces in SG t (π t ) are infinite and the cost function w t may not have a simple bilinear structure likec t . Therefore, it is not clear if each of the single-stage games SG t (π t ) can be solved in a tractable manner in general. Moreover, Assumption 3 may not always be true.
Nevertheless, this characterization can be very helpful in some specific cases. In the next section, we discuss an information structure in which Assumption 3 is guaranteed to be true and the cost w t satisfies structural properties that might make the computation of the value and equilibria of the single-stage games SG t (π t ) tractable. Further, we will show that for this information structure, the dynamic programming characterization in Theorem 2 allows us to find an equilibrium strategy for player 1 in the original game G .
V. GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION ON ONE SIDE AND PARTIAL INFORMATION ON THE OTHER
In this section, we consider a zero-sum stochastic game in which player 1 has complete information, that is, he knows the current state and the entire observation and action history of both players. On the other hand, player 2 has only partial information on the state and player 1's action history. For games with this information structure, we show that (i) a Nash equilibrium, and hence the value of the game, exists; (ii) Assumption 3 is valid and the value can be computed using the methodology proposed in Section IV; (iii) the dynamic program in Section IV can be used to compute an equilibrium strategy for player 1 in the original game G .
Consider a system with state evolution as in equation (1). At each time t, player 1 observes the state perfectly but player 2 gets an imperfect observation Y 2 t defined as follows:
